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CASENOTE; State v. Cheetham: Montana Supreme Court Refuses
to Substitute Strickland Standard When Analyzing Substitution of
Counsel Claims
Cori Losing
I. INTRODUCTION
Distinct from a criminal defendant’s right to effective assistance
of counsel is a defendant’s right to counsel of choice.1 In State v.
Cheetham,2 the Montana Supreme Court erroneously analyzed the
defendant’s substitution of counsel claim under a standard that blends
substitution of counsel with ineffective assistance of counsel.3
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In January 2014, Timothy Cheetham Sr. was charged with sexual
intercourse without consent, sexual assault, and sexual abuse of children.4
At trial, N.S. testified that Cheetham had touched her inappropriately on
her chest and her vagina, had forced her to watch child pornography, and
had forced her to have intercourse with Cheetham once.5 Cheetham was
found guilty on all three counts.6
Prior to Cheetham’s sentencing hearing, defense attorney Steven
Scott filed a motion to dismiss for negligent destruction of evidence.7 Scott
argued that the “State failed to provide and preserve an exculpatory
medical report of a forensic medical examination performed in 2006 on
N.S. by Dr. Salisbury.”8 Scott quoted the report as stating “N.S.’s exam
was within normal limits with copious amounts of hymen intact.9 This
does not negate the possibility of a penetration injury. 10 The narrowing
noticed in the above exam, could be consistent with patient’s history and
suspicious of a previous injury.”11 When Scott tried to obtain the medical
report from the county attorney, the county attorney told Scott that the
report “could not be obtained through Child Protective Services (CPS).”12
Because CPS referenced the report, Scott determined the medical report
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had been negligently destroyed.13 The State was neither able to obtain the
report nor did it find the report favorable to Cheetham because it did not
“negate the possibility of penetration injury.”14 Eventually, Scott was able
to obtain the 2006 medical report.15 However, Scott decided to withdraw
his motion before the district court ruled on it.16
On the day of his sentencing hearing, Cheetham appeared with a
letter addressed to the court and the chief public defender.17 The letter
alleged that Scott had failed to effectively assist Cheetham in his defense.18
In his letter, Cheetham argued that, because N.S.’s hymen was intact, the
medical report could have created reasonable doubt that the penetration
incident had occurred; therefore, Cheetham requested that Scott be
dismissed and replaced.19
After questioning the county attorney, Scott, and Cheetham, the
district court determined that there was “no total breakdown of
communication” between Cheetham and Scott.20 Cheetham was sentenced
to the Montana State Prison for 150 years.21 Cheetham appealed to the
Montana Supreme Court, raising two issues: (1) whether the district court
abused its discretion by failing to conduct an adequate inquiry into
Cheetham’s request for substitute counsel; and (2) whether Cheetham was
denied effective assistance of counsel.”22
Finding Cheetham’s second issue as not record-based, the State,
in its brief, allocated a majority of its analysis to the issue of substitution
of counsel.23 While the State argued that the district court’s inquiry into
Cheetham’s claim was adequate, the State also insisted that the Court
clarify its substitution of counsel standard.24 The State claimed that the
Court should adopt the good cause standard applied in federal courts.25
Under this standard, the State asserted that a defendant’s motion for
substitution of counsel would be granted if the defendant showed good
cause by establishing that there was a “conflict of interest, a complete
breakdown of communication, or an irreconcilable conflict.”26 The State
further argued that record-based ineffective assistance of counsel claims
should be raised on direct appeal and should not be considered by the
district court to determine whether the defendant should have been
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afforded substitute counsel.27 Instead, the state argued that courts should
focus on whether a defendant has shown good cause to warrant
substitution of counsel.28
III. MAJORITY OPINION
A. District Court’s Inquiry into Cheetham’s Request for Substitute
Counsel.
The Court first held that the district court’s inquiry into
Cheetham’s request for substitution of counsel was adequate and any
further hearing on Cheetham’s complaint was unnecessary.29 Forgoing the
State’s suggestion that the Court adopt the federal standard for substitution
of counsel, the Court applied the following test grounded in Montana case
law: “the defendant bears the burden of presenting material facts to
establish a ‘complete collapse’ of the attorney-client relationship, a total
lack of communication, or ineffective assistance of counsel.”30 The
majority stated that a district court’s inquiry into a defendant’s substitution
of counsel claim is adequate when the court considers the “defendant’s
factual complaints together with counsel’s specific explanations
addressing the complaints.31 A cursory inquiry into the defendant’s
complaint will not suffice.32 A hearing on the validity of the defendant’s
complaint is only necessary when the court finds the defendant’s
complaint is “seemingly substantial.”33
Focusing on ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court reasoned
that a complaint for ineffective assistance of counsel is “‘seemingly
substantial’ if it satisfies the two-prong Strickland test: (1) that counsel’s
performance was deficient; (2) that deficient performance prejudiced the
defendant.34 Relying on State v. Dethman, the Court claims that a
difference in opinion over trial strategy between the defendant and his
counsel does not give rise to a seemingly substantial complaint.35
Therefore, the Court determined that the district court’s inquiry was
adequate because the district court correctly compared Cheetham’s factual
allegations to Scott’s explanations of Cheetham’s complaints to conclude
Cheetham did not raise a substantial complaint.36

27

Id. at 22.
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Cheetham, 373 P.3d at 49, 51–53.
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Since the district court suggested a total breakdown of
communication was required to obtain new counsel, the Montana Supreme
Court acknowledged that a “total breakdown of communication may be
separate grounds for obtaining new counsel from a claim that counsel is
rendering ineffective assistance.”37 Without articulating a test for
determining whether there was a total breakdown of communication
between Cheetham and his attorney, the Court agreed with the district
court’s finding that it was relevant to inquire whether the communication
between the two was civil because the complaint occurred late in
Cheetham’s court proceedings when only the sentencing hearing
remained.38 Affirming the district court’s finding, the Court found that
Cheetham failed to raise a seemingly substantial claim; therefore, further
inquiry by the district court was unnecessary.39
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Because Cheetham’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for
Scott’s failure to introduce the 2006 medical report was not record-based,
the Court declined to address Cheetham’s second issue on direct appeal.40
IV. JUSTICE MCKINNON’S CONCURRENCE
Agreeing with the Court’s analysis on the second issue, Justice
McKinnon focused her concurrence solely on the first issue. 41 Justice
McKinnon stated that the Court failed to articulate a standard for district
court judges to apply when conducting their initial inquiry into a
defendant’s substitution of counsel claims.42 In her analysis, Justice
McKinnon noted that the Court continues to require satisfaction of both
prongs of Strickland “without setting forth any analytical distinction from
a substitution claim.”43 Justice McKinnon also claimed that the Court does
not actually apply the Strickland test; rather, the Court determined that
“Cheetham did not raise a ‘seemingly substantial’ complaint of ineffective
assistance of counsel.”44
Finding the majority’s blending of ineffective assistance of
counsel with a substitution of counsel claim flawed, Justice McKinnon,
like the State, urged the Court to clarify its inconsistent precedent on
substitution of counsel claims by adopting the standard applied in the
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Cheetham, 373 P.3d at 51–52.
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majority of federal courts.45 The standard, Justice McKinnon states, should
require the defendant to show “a conflict of interest, an irreconcilable
conflict, or a complete breakdown in communication between the attorney
and the defendant” to warrant substitution of counsel.46 In evaluating
whether substitution of counsel is warranted, Justice McKinnon noted that
the trial court should employ the following facts and circumstances test:
“timeliness of the motion, adequacy of the court’s inquiry into the
defendant’s complaint, and whether the attorney-client conflict was so
great that it resulted in total lack of communication preventing an adequate
defense.”47
Unlike the majority, Justice McKinnon further analyzed the total
breakdown in communication issue. In her reasoning, Justice McKinnon
asserted that conflict over differences of trial strategy between the
defendant and his attorney could lead to a total breakdown in
communication.48 Therefore, Justice McKinnon asserted that the trial
judge’s inquiry into the defendant’s claim must focus on “whether the
serious breakdown in communication results in an inadequate defense.”49
While Justice McKinnon furthers the Court’s analysis and urges the
adoption of a clearer standard for substitution of counsel claims, Justice
McKinnon agreed with the majority that there was no total breakdown in
communication between Cheetham and his attorney.50 Therefore, Justice
McKinnon, like the majority, found that further inquiry by the district
court was unwarranted.51
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Judicial Skepticism of Substitution of Counsel Claims
Judicial skepticism may lead judges to deny even worthy
substitution of counsel motions.52 For indigent defendants like Cheetham,
judges are less likely to find a breakdown in the attorney-client
relationship to justify granting a motion for substitution of counsel.53
Judicial skepticism results from a judge’s suspicions of the defendant and
his counsel, coupled with imperfect tests that district courts are required
to apply to substitution of counsel motions.54 Generally, judges may
45
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Id. at 55–56.
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2682 (2005).
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Id. at 2680–81.
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experience the following concerns about a defendant’s motion for
substitute counsel: (1) granting the motion will not actually resolve the
conflict between the defendant and his counsel; (2) the defendant is
manipulating the judge into delaying the defendant’s trial; (3) the
defendant will “abuse the judicial process;” (4) appointing a new lawyer
will create an economic burden on society; and (5) the defendant’s
concerns about his attorney are related to the larger issue of the defendant
having criminal charges brought against him.55
While judges often recognize that disagreements between the
defendant and his counsel exist, judges are unlikely to find any
disagreement rising to the level of a breakdown in the attorney-client
relationship.56 Judges often note that conflicts between a defendant and
his attorney are inevitable since the defendant objects to the criminal
charges being brought against him, the defendant may have difficulty
working with others, or the defendant and his counsel disagree on
counsel’s proposed trial strategy.57 One of the root causes of judicial
skepticism is the economic implication of appointing new counsel and
the impact granting a motion for substitution of counsel will have on
judicial economy. Judges often doubt whether granting a defendant’s
motion for substitution of counsel is worth the increased expense of
appointing a new attorney to represent the defendant.58 Further,
substituting counsel requires a pause in the judicial process, leading to
overcrowded judicial dockets.59
B. Reliance on Strickland Standard in Substitution of Counsel Claims
The Sixth Amendment affords a defendant the right to choice of
counsel.60 A defendant’s implicit right to substitute counsel is often
viewed as an extension of the right to choice of counsel.61 However, the
right to choice of counsel does not extend to indigent defendants who have
appointed counsel.62 Instead, indigent defendant’s implied right to
substitution of counsel is based on the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right
to counsel.63 A defendant’s right to substitute counsel is invoked when a
breakdown in communication between the defendant and his counsel
becomes so grave that it frustrates counsel’s ability to provide an adequate
defense.64 Therefore, this qualified right is afforded when counsel’s failure

55

Id. at 2691–92, 2697.
Id. at 2693.
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Id. at 32 at 2694.
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Id. at 2697.
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Id. at 2697–98.
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U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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United States v. Smith, 640 F.3d 580, 587 (4th Cir. 2011).
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to assist the defendant in his defense violates the defendant’s right to
effective assistance of counsel.65
While a defendant’s right to substitution of counsel concerns the
right to effective assistance of counsel, the Second, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh,
Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuit Courts do not equate the Strickland
ineffective assistance of counsel standard with the substitution of counsel
standard.66 Like these circuit courts, Justice McKinnon proposes that to
warrant substitution of counsel, the standard should require a defendant to
demonstrate “conflict of interest, an irreconcilable conflict, or a complete
breakdown in communication between attorney and the defendant.”67
However, unlike the federal standard, the Montana Supreme Court
outlines a substitution of counsel standard that includes ineffective
assistance of counsel,68 thus concluding that the Strickland standard
applies to Cheetham’s complaints.69
The Sixth Circuit has ruled on the issue of incorporating
Strickland into substitution of counsel claims in Wison v. Mintzes. The
Sixth Circuit notes that Strickland should not be applied to substitution of
counsel claims because the violation of the right to counsel of choice does
not mean that the defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel is
also violated.70 In Wilson, the Sixth Circuit stated that applying the
Strickland standard for substitution of counsel motions would require a
defendant “who cannot communicate with counsel, who is dissatisfied
with counsel or whose defense is burdened by a conflict of interest to prove
that counsel’s conduct rises to the level of constitutional
ineffectiveness.”71 The Sixth Circuit further stated that this high burden
for proving ineffective counsel should not be placed on any criminal
defendant.72 Placing such a burden on the defendant would undermine
certain principles of the defendant’s qualified right to counsel of choice;73
therefore, applying the Strickland ineffective assistance standard to
substitution of counsel claims is flawed.74
In Wilson, the Sixth Circuit noted that it was not aware of any
court that places on defendants the high burden proving ineffective
assistance of counsel before granting the defendant’s motion for
65

Id.
United States v. Whaley, 788 F.2d 581, 583 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Jones, 795 F.3d 791,
796 (8th Cir. 2015); United States v. Sullivan, 431 F.3d 976, 979–80 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v.
Padilla, 819 F.2d 952, 955 (10th Cir. 1987); United States v. Young, 482 F.2d 993, 995 (5th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Morris, 714 F.2d 669, 673 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v. Welty, 674 F.2d 185,188
(3d Cir. 1982); McKee v. Harris, 649 F.2d 927, 931 (2d Cir. 1981).
67
Cheetham, 373 P.3d at 55–56 (McKinnon, J., concurring) (citing United States v. Swinney, 970 F.2d
494, 499 (8th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1011, 113 S. Ct. 632 (1992)).
68
Id. at 50 (majority opinion).
69
Id.
70
Wilson, 761 F.2d at 283 (6th Cir. 1985).
71
761 F.2d 275, 283 (6th Cir. 1985).
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Wilson, 761 F.2d at 283.
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substitution of counsel.75 This statement is true when focusing on
substitution of counsel cases in the Second, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth,
Ninth, and Tenth Circuit Courts. While these circuit courts are not as
forward as the Sixth Circuit about the problematic effects of equating the
ineffective assistance standard with substitution of counsel, these circuit
courts, nonetheless, do not incorporate the Strickland standard into the
substitution of counsel analysis.76
In her concurrence, Justice McKinnon claims that the Court
incorporates ineffective assistance of counsel with substitution of counsel
without providing any analytical distinction.77 Justice McKinnon correctly
notes that while the Court looks to Strickland when reviewing Cheetham’s
substitution of counsel claim, the Court does not actually apply Strickland
to Cheetham’s claim.78 However, the district court, following the Court,
appears to have applied Strickland to Cheetham’s complaint. During the
district court’s questioning of Cheetham and his attorney, the district court
focused on whether communication between the two parties was civil.79
Nevertheless, in its finding, the district court also noted that it had
reservations about replacing Scott as Cheetham’s attorney because Scott
had effectively assisted Cheetham in his defense.80 By allowing effective
counsel to be an issue in Cheetham’s substitution of counsel claim, the
district court is following the Strickland standard. In doing so, Montana
courts have placed a high burden on a defendant that requires a showing
that his attorney’s performance was deficient rather than simply showing
a breakdown in communication, a conflict of interest, or an irreconcilable
conflict.81 Therefore, the Court justified the Sixth Circuit’s concern when
the Court’s chosen substitution of counsel standard required a defendant
to show that he has received ineffective assistance of counsel prior to
granting substitute counsel.
In the future, the Court should adopt the federal standard for
substitution of counsel claims in order to avoid blending effective
assistance of counsel with substitution of counsel claims at the expense of
a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights. The Sixth Amendment affords
criminal defendants the right to a fair trial.82 For indigent defendants,
implicit in this right is the right to choice of counsel when the defendant’s
appointed counsel has failed to provide effective legal assistance.83 Central
75

Wilson, 761 F.2d at 283 (6th Cir. 1985).
Whaley, 788 F.2d at 583 (9th Cir. 1986); Jones, 795 F.3d at 796 (8th Cir. 2015); Sullivan, 431 F.3d
at 979–80 (6th Cir. 2005); Padilla, 819 F.2d at 955 (10th Cir. 1987); Young, 482 F.2d at 995 (5th Cir.
1973); Morris, 714 F.2d at 673 (7th Cir. 1983); Welty, 674 F.2d at 188 (3d Cir. 1982); McKee, 649
F.2d at 931 (2d Cir. 1981).
77
Cheetham, 373 P.3d at 54 (McKinnon, J., concurring).
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Id. at 51 (majority opinion).
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Id. at 55–56 (McKinnon, J., concurring).
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to the attorney-client relationship are the principles of trust and
confidence.84 If a client does not trust his attorney, the attorney’s ability to
assist the client will be materially impaired.85 Effective representation is
unlikely when there is a complete breakdown in the attorney-client
relationship.86 Without a clear standard for substitution of counsel claims
that ensures an indigent defendant has a meaningful level of confidence in
their counsel, Montana risks obtaining convictions that are less reliable.
Therefore, the Court must ensure the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights
are not violated in order to avoid a breakdown in the adversarial process.
V. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
The Court’s refusal to eliminate the Strickland test from the
substitution of counsel standard will arguably result in more denials of
defendants’ motions for substitution of counsel. After a court denies an
indigent defendant’s motion for substitution of counsel, the defendant will
have two options: (1) continue with his present counsel, or (2) proceed pro
se.87 If the defendant continues with his present counsel, it is likely that
the relationship between the two could be strained and the defendant’s
trust in his counsel, and the justice system, will deteriorate. If the
defendant continues pro se, the defendant will likely be prejudiced by his
lack of legal expertise.88 Furthermore, the rise in pro se litigants has
“disrupted the efficiency of the courts, causing courtroom delays and
overburdening judges, attorneys, and court staff.”89 Therefore, future
implications of not adopting the federal standard for substitution of
counsel claims could prejudice the defendant and have a negative impact
on Montana courts.
VI. CONCLUSION
A criminal defendant’s right to choice of counsel is
distinguishable from a defendant’s right to effective assistance of
counsel.90 In Cheetham, the Court refused to adopt the federal standard for
substitution of counsel claims, leaving district courts with an unclear
standard to apply to a defendant’s substitution of counsel claims.91 In
doing so, the Court blended the Strickland ineffective assistance standard

84

Goldstein, supra n. 52 at 2668.
Id. at 2669.
Id. at 2674.
87
Cheetham, 373 P.3d at 50.
88
Drew A. Swank, In Defense of Rules and Roles: The Need to Curb Extreme Forms of Pro Se
Assistance and Accommodation in Litigation, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 1537, 1548 (2005).
89
Id. at 1548.
90
Wilson, 761 F.2d at 283 (5th Cir.1985) (citation omitted).
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Cheetham, 373 P.3d at 52.
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with the substitution of counsel standard.92 Therefore, unless a defendant
can articulate that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, Montana
courts likely will not grant a defendant’s motion for substitution of
counsel. If the Court continues to use the Montana standard for
substitution of counsel claims, there will likely be a rise in both the number
of strained attorney-defendant relationships and pro se defendants. This
rise will likely have a detrimental effect on indigent criminal defendants
and Montana courts. Therefore, the Court should reconsider Justice
McKinnon’s concurrence and the State’s recommendation and choose to
adopt the federal substitution of counsel standard.

92

Id. at 54 (McKinnon, J., concurring).

